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CONCERTED WILLS-A POSSIBLE DEVICE FOR
AVOIDING THE WIDOW'S PRIVILEGE OF
RENUNCIATION
ALVIN E. EVNANS*
It is no surprising thing that two persons whose lives have
vlosely traveled the same path for many years should consult
together regarding the disposition of their individual property
after their respective deaths. There may be the motive of pro-
viding each for the other, or even a bargaining whereby each
also has a weather eye on his own prospects. Since there are so
many motives, arrangements and idiosyncrasies possible with
respect to the wills or will which they may produce, no single
term, so far, has successfully described these instruments.'
The writer of this paper has more or less arbitrarily omitted
a general treatment of contracts to make wills and has devoted
himself to a discussion of joint or mutual wills as such. Several
reasons may be suggested for this: (a) Contracts to make a will
do not necessarily and usually do not involve more than the will
of one person and they have been rather adequately dealt with
elsewhere. (b) In the ease of joint and mutual wills, the terms
are contained within the wills if they are reduced to writing at
all.- (e) Where the contract is found in the will or wills, the
consideration given each testator for his will is the execution by
the other of his will. This is not the case where simply a con-
* Dean, University of Kentucky Law School.
'See 2 A. L. R. 1193; id. 3-172; 33 id. 739; 43 id. 1020; 57 id. 607;
60 id. 627; 102 id. 485; an excellent article by Professor Eagleton,
Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of
Conveyancing (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 358; Note (1935) 29 ILL. L. REV.1090. As to the policy involved, see Partridge, Revocability of
Mutual Wills (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 357.
'See Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350 (1935). (This
case holds the joint will of husband and.-wife is valid as a contract
and so is binding on a second wife, the surviving husband having
remarried); Underwood v. Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S. E. 696 (1929);
Note (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 663.
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tract is made to execute a will which is to contain certain de-
fined provisions. Thus, very many contracts to make a will are
made by the promisor in1 consideration of service or support.
Perhaps also (d) in the contract cases an immediate interest is
given the promisee in the property of the promisor, so that the
will is not revocable, whereas in many joint will cases the will
is truly ambulatory. (e) It would appear generally that a
statute revoking all wills made prior to the marriage of the
testator would be applicable only to ambulatory wills. (f)
Though a will may have been made in pursuance of a contract,
which contract was entered into before marriage (to devise ac-
cording to a named plan), yet the will may be made at a later
date and after the occurrence of certain events. These events
may raise an issue as to the desirability of the performance of
the contract.3  (g) In all cases of joint wills the execution is the
simultaneous act of both testators. In practically all and per-
haps all cases of mutual wills the execution by each actor is part
of a single transaction. 4 This need not be and often is not true
respecting the making of a will in carrying out a contract.
1. Tii TERMS USED
The fact that the wills of two or more persons are similar
or even identical mittatis mutandis is not necessarily proof and
.in the opinion of this writer is no proof that they were made
under the influence of a contract or even of an understanding,
though the case is likely to be rare where the wills point toward
a common object and the testators have not discussed the mat-
ter with each other.5 Though it is most natural that a husband
and a wife should each give his or her all to the other, and there
need be no concert, yet in so important a matter they will usually
seek the advice of each other or find out how the wind blows.
-See Wides v. Wides, - Ky. -, - S. W. (2d) - (1945);
Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910); Arland's Estate,
131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924) (Deed of community property
made by each spouse and placed in escrow, to be delivered at death,
the survivor to leave the future property to their children. Husband
remarried). See also Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S. W. 942
(1915); 69 A. L. R. 14; 106 A. L. R. 742.
See Notes 58 and 59, infra.
Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934); Menke v.
Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky.
76, 17 S. W. 199 (1891); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W.
1027 (1914).
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There is still no contract and each is free to revoke. The sepa-
rate wills, in a sense, may be reciprocal, but this fact does not
necessarily imply some agreement for advantage. It is only
where there is a bargain whereby two or more persons, by pre-
vious agreement, make their several wills, each in consideration
of the other, that an obligation arises which prevents free revo-
cation." The consideration contemplated may be a promised
benefit to the other testator or to some third person whom that
testator desires to provide for or to both. Thus, two or more
wills may be reciprocal and still revocable.7  Each testator pro-
vides for the other. Often, however, courts have held that this
reciprocal element is itself sufficient evidence of a contract, even
though these provisions would naturally be made without any
agreenent
The term "mutual" is used in the cases with any one of
four or more connotations: (a) The testators have conferred
with each other and thereafter executed wills or a will which
was influenced by that conference. (b) "Mutual" may be used
with the additional connotation of a reciprocal character to the
effect that each executor receives some benefit from the will of
the other. (c) It is also used with the further significance that
the parties have bargained with each other and provisions in
the will of one are made in consideration of dispositions in the
will of the other. The same idea of mutuality is occasionally
found in other contract cases, that is, it is the equivalent of con-
sideration.-" Again (d), as in the doctrine of mutuality of
remedy, "mutual" may mean that one is not bound unless the
other is also bound. While the word "mutual" is sometimes
used in a contractual sense,"' vet all that should fairly be in-
Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E. 319 (1928); Howells
v. Martin, 101 N. J. Eq. 275, 137 Atl. 565 (1927); re Rosenblath's
Estate, 263 N. Y. S. 303 (Sur. 1933); Flower v. Flower, 166 N. E.
914 (Ohio App. 1928); Holman v. Lutz, 132 Ore. 185, 282 Pac. 241
(1929); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So. 749 (1918).
7 Klussman v. Wessling, 238 Ill. 568, 87 N. E. 544 (1909).
"Chambers v. Porter, 183 N. W. 431 (Iowa, 1921); Stevens v.
Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918); re Weir's Will, 134 Wash.
560, 236 Pac. 285 (1925)-not reciprocal; Underwood v. Myer, 107
W. Va. 57, 146 S. E. 696 (1929) (The only evidence of contract was
the fact that the instrument was the joint will of husband and wife);
Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763 (1924).
"See Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So. 749 (1918); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) sec. 103E.
"Re Johnson's Estate, - Iowa -, 10 N. W. (2d) 664 (1943);
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ferrable from the term "mutual" is that the instruments were
made as a result of some understanding between the testators.
That understanding need by no means be contractual in na-
ture. 11
Since the term "mutual" so often means that the instru-
ments are made after the parties have advised with each other,
a better term is needed. Neither "mutual" nor "reciprocal"
has a clear connotation. The word "concerted" readily covers
all situations, contractural as well as those merely mutual and
reciprocal. It implies nothing as to the issue of the freedom of
the testator to revoke. Therefore, wills that chance to be alike
mutatis mutandis but executed without prior discussion of the
matter would not be concerted wills.
Joint wills cannot well be other than concerted wills. No
two pel'sons would conceivably execute the same instrument
without some understanding prior to the act of execution.' 2
They are, of course, always mutual in that they have some refer-
ence, explicit or implicit, to each other, as in (a) above, 13 but
they may or may not be reciprocal, and there may or may not be
in them evidence of a bargaining. 14 They may take the form
of a deed and are to be construed as wills because theeffect
(perhaps unknown to their authors) is to pass title only after
death. If they are not contractual, there is no impediment to
revocation any more than in the case where there are two wills.
Whether contractual wills are also revocable is considered sub-
sequently. A joint will may be the identical language of two
persons, written once,' 5 or it may be the equivalent of two sepa-
Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N. W. 316 (1938); Chambers v.
Porter, 183 N. W. 431 (Iowa, 1921); Carle v. Miles, 89 Kan. 540, 132
Pac. 146 (1913); Will of Diez, 50 N. Y. 88 (1872); Wagnon v. Wagnon,
16 S. W. (2d) 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); re Weir's Will, 134 Wash.
560, 236 Pac. 285 (1925); Estate of Heys (1914) P. 192.
"American Trust Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N. E. 843
(1928).
'See Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N. W. 56(1915).
" Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696 (1917); Williams
v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So. 749 (1918); Note (1928) 14 CoRN.
L. Q. 108.
'Frontier Lodge v. Wilson, 139 Kan. 75, 30 P. (2d) 307 (1934);
Phillips v. Murphy, 186 Ky. 763, 218 S. W. 250 (1920); re Cawley's
Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567 (1890). It is difficult to find a bar-
gaining in Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350 (1935) and in
Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915).
5 e.g., Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76, 17 S. W. 199 (1891); Price v.
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rate wills, the terms of each being individually stated in one
instrument, frequently in identical terms.16
In Murphy v. Black17 the spouses each executed simultane-
ously a reciprocal, separate will, devising the whole of the tes-
tator's property to the other in fee, as the pleading seems to
show. One hour later they executed a joint will by which (as
alleged) they left the entire property, whether of the one or of
the other (there being no co-ownership) to defendants. The
husband was the survivor and this action was brought by him to
quiet title against defendants, who claimed under the joint will.
The court decided that under the two separate wills the intent
was to leave to the survivor a life estate. This conclusion was
drawn from the fact that they also executed each a separate
will. It is not readily seen how this follows from the premises.
Prior to the death of the husband, the joint will could not have
been probated as his will. There being no other evidence of a
contract, it was premature to decide that the joint will bound
the survivor. In another case"' the court found that although
there was a binding contract between the spouses to the effect
that their joint will should leave the property to their son, after
the death of the survivor, yet, on the death of the mother, the
son bad no vested interest which would pass to his trustee in
bankruptcy. This result seems unjustifiable.
It is sometimes said that a joint will is to be regarded as
irrevocable where if the same provisions were made in separate
wills they would not be. 19 It will be later shown that this view
is not well taken.
In the early eases the courts were much troubled with joint
wills. How could the act of two parties express the individual
will of each? Could such a will be probated twice? Could a
will which must always be ambulatory be revoked, when joint,
Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350 (1935); re Raupp's Will, 31
N. Y. S. 680 (Sur. 1894).
'Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); re Caw-
ley's Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567 (1390); Doyle v. Fischer, 183
Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763 (1924).
"744 Iowa 176 (1876). See Seat v. Seat, 172 Tenn. 618, 113
S. W. (2d) 751 (1938).
'"In re Lage, 19 F. (2d) 153 (D. C. Iowa, 1927).
" Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915);
Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898); Burress v. Blair,
61 Mo. 133 (1875).
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by the act of one of the parties? It was said not to be the will
of either alone because it did not purport to be.2-'
A further difficulty has arisen in those few cases where the
joint will provides that it shall have no effect until after the
death of the survivor. One solution, taken in Connecticut,:"
was that the will was impractical and must fail. Another was
that no effect could be given to it until the death of the survivor,
in which event presumably it is to be probated2 2 as the will of
each. Another is to probate it on the death of the first to die
in spite of that provision. 2-3 The last solution seems preferable.
2. TIHE PROPERTY INVOLVED
It is assumed here that the term "joint will" means al in-
strument executed by two or more parties and that it is joint
because they acted together. It has been asserted, however, that
a joint will is one where the testators dispose of joint property;
that unless the property is owned together by some form of co-
ownership, the will is mutual but not joint.2 4 That use of the
term shifts the application from the act of the parties to their
property and it is apparently quite too restrictive to assume that
there must always be joint property where there is a joint will.
If it were true that a will by co-owners is the only case
where a joint will can exist, there would be far fewer of them.
However, there are cases where the character of the property
devised has appeared in the evidence and has, to some extent.
been a factor. It would seem to be a not unusual thing for co-
owners being associated thus in their property interests to make
a common disposition rather than for them to act quite inde-
pendently of each other. Thus, cases of husband and wife who
2
"Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879), discussed in detail in
Drake, The Public Policy of Contracts to Will Future Acquired
Property (1909) 7 MICH. L. REV. 318, at 326-329: Clayton v. Liver-
man, 19 N. C. (2 D. & B.) 558 (1837); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St.
157 (1862); Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 E. R. 96 (Eccl.
1822).
-"State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255 (1896).
'Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S. W. 812 (1927); Hof-
fert's Estate, 65 Pa. Sup. 515 (1917).
'Graham v. Graham, 297 Mo. 290, 249 S. W. 37 (1923); Seat v.
Seat, 172 Tenn. 618, 113 S. W. (2d) 751 (1938); Goods of Piazzi-
Smyth (1898) P. 7.
24Desmeumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl. 703 (1909);
Everdell v. Hill, 58 N. Y. S. 447 (Misc. 1899). See Note (1907) 20
HARV. L. REV. 315.
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,,hance to be tenants by the entirety,25 as also other persons who
may be tenants ill common, 2'1 joint tenants,2 7 or tenants in
partnership'" appear not infrequently. Some of them affect
community property.29  From the standpoint of the validity
of the will, however, where the parties are bargaining, it is
more important that both have property to pass under it than
that they have a co-ownership interest in it. " 1 Where the parties
are strangers and have no common property interests, as, for
example, where neighbors owning adjoining lots agree each to
devise his lot to the other, it is less likely that the court will find
that the wills resulted from a bargain. 31
In Gormen v. Cause3 2 a man and woman in a community
property state made an antenuptial agreement to the effect that
any property acquired by either after marriage should be the
separate property of the acquirer. This agreement was fol-
'Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696 (1917). In
Towle v. Wood, 60 N. H. 434 (1881) husband and wife each had a
bank account and each desired to leave his account to the other.
They executed a conveyance each to the other, not to be operative
until death and not attested. In Popejoy v. Peters, 173 Tenn. 484,
121 S. W. (2d) 538 (1938) property went to wife as survivor and not
under the joint will. It was levied on and sold at suit of creditors
after death of husband, for debts of wife.
Minor v. Minor, 15 Ohio Dec. 264 (1904); Betts v. Harper, 39
Ohio St. 639 (1884).
'Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); Tate v. Emery, 139 Ore.
214, 9 P. (2d) 136 (1932); Schram v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P.
(2d) 14 (1931). In the case of re Raupp's Will, 31 N. Y. S. 680 (Sur.
1894) the nature of the ownership is not disclosed, as also it is not .in
Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350 (1935).
'Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920); Stewart
v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N. W. 619 (1919); Herman v. Ludwig,
174 N. Y. S. 469 (App. D. 1919), affd. 229 N. Y. 544, 129 N. E. 908
(1920); Watson's Estate, 213 N. C. 309, 195 S. E. 772 (1938); Goods
of Raine, 1 Sw. & Tr. 144 (Eccl. 1858).
-'Estate of Anderson, 16 Ariz. 185, 141 Pac. 723 (1914); Rolls
v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928); Estate of Rolls, 193 Cal.
594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); Belkin v. Ray, 176 S. W. (2d) 162 (Tex.,
1944) (The court found husband and wife to be both owners of com-
munity property and joint tenants of other property, the wife having
conveyed her separate estate to a third person who reconveyed to hus-
band and wife); Prince v. Prince, 34 Wash. 552, 117 Pac. 255 (1911):
Dennyssen v. Mostert, 8 Moo. 502, 526, 17 E. R. 400 (P. C. 1872).
Cf. Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924).
"'Re Johnson's Estate, - Iowa -, 10 N. W. (2d) 664 (1943).
See Moore v. Samuelson, 107 Kan. 744, 193 Pac. 369 (1920); Allen
v. Allen, 28 Kan. 14 (1882); in re Rogers, 11 Me. 303 (1881); re
Hansen's Estate, 87 Neb. 567, 127 N. W. 879 (1910); and Kunnen v.
Zurline, 2 Cin. Sup. Ct. R. 440 (1873).
'Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927 (1925).
256 S. W. (2d) 855 (Tex. Com. of App. 1933).
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lowed by mutual wills each reciting that the other should have
the property standing in his or her own name and nothing
more. The balance was given by each to his legal heirs. It was
held that the agreement was void as it sought to set at naught
the laws of the state affecting community property. The de-
cision seems to be wrong. There was nothing illegal about the
mutual wills, 33 and the survivor, having accepted the benefits
of the will of the one first to die, should be estopped to deny
the validity of the agreement. 34
3. THE EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT 'MARRIAGE, RENUNCIATION AND
OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Concerted wills may be required to run the gamut of var-
ions statutory provisions which were not enacted with this type
of will specifically in view. Thus, the common provision that
wills shall be revoked by subsequent marriage has been invoked
to avoid a concerted will. It seems inevitable, however, that if a
contract based upon adequate consideration is sufficient in ef-
fect to make a will irrevocable, that result will arise, even
though there may have been a subsequent marriage. 35 The
statute applies to ambulatory wills only.
A woman who marries a spouse after the latter has so
bound himself by contract undertakes the marriage constrained
by all obligations then existing. 30 No legislative piu'pose has
been discovered by the courts which. should avoid in this way
existing rights and duties. On the other hand, wills are corn-
monly revocable and if the testator in a concerted will did not
bind himself in such a way as to limit his power of revocation,
Gorman v. Gause, 5Q S. W. (2d) 855 (Tex. Com. of App. 1933).
3'Martin v. Helms, 319 Ill. 281, 149 N. E. 770 (1925); Price v.
Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350 (1935); Coghlin v. Coghlin, 26
Ohio C. C. 18 (1904); Burkhart v. Rogers, 134 Okla. 219, 273 Pac.
246 (1928).
'Estate of Anderson, 16 Ariz. 185, 141 Pac. 723 (1914); Houck
v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. 502, 131 Pac. 975 (1913); Baker v. Syfritt,
147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910); Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269,
178 Pac. 421 (1919); Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W. (2d) 350(1935); Desmeumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl. 703 (1909);
Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Underwood
v. Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S. E. 696 (1929).
"At least this seems true where joint or mutual wills are in-
volved. As to contracts for a will, see Wides v. Wides, - Ky. -,
- S. W. (2d) - (1945).
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his later marriage will have a revocatory effect under the
statute.
3 7
Bzehrle v. Buehrle "8 illustrates the effect of a renunciation
by the widow of the benefits arising under a contractual will
between the husband and another person. Two brothers, busi-
ness partners, contracted that the survivor should receive, un-
der the will of the other, the latter's share in the partnership
property. The consideration therefor was that at the death of
the first to die, his widow should receive the proceeds of a life
insurance policy, the premiums upon which were to be paid by
the partnership. On the death of the plaintiff's husband, the
plaintiff renounced the will and claimed her statutory share
in her husband's property. Though the will was clearly con-
tractual in character (the contract having been entered into in
writing following which mutual wills were executed), it was
held that renunciation avoided the will. The court observed
that: "The public policy of this state declared by statute is
that a husband cannot by will deprive his widow of her rights
in his estate." " . . . the interest of the deceased brother in the
wholesale liquor business is the property of his estate." This
decision does not conflict, however, with the principle of the
marriage cases and seems to be sound because the wife was not
a party to the contract. In at least two cases the wife, as
sur,iz,or, has effectively renounced the benefits under the hus-
band's will. In one it was held that she was not bound where
she accepted nothing under it 3 9 and in the other the evidence
of a bargain was insufficient. 4" But if the wife has validly
bargained for benefits under the husband's will, she cannot
renounce. The unwary must observe that in the Bzuehrle Case
above the bargaining was not between husband and renouncing
wife. A wife may well renounce, even in the case of concerted
Peoria Humane Soc. v. McMurtrie, 229 Ill. 579, 82 N. E. 319
(1907) (Mother and son made joint will-son later married); Wat-
son's Estate, 213 N. C. 309, 195 S. E. 772 (1938) (Three brothers made
contractual concerted wills but on subsequent marriage of one,
released each other from the contract. One did not thereafter
revoke his will; Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, "19 S. E. 739 (1894); Re
Oldham (1925) Ch. 75; Cf. Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac.
157 (1924) (second wife takes under the Statute of Descent and Dis-
tribution).
"'291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920).
'Re Rhodes Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 121 Atl. 327 (1923).
'Rice v. Winchell, 385 Ill. 36, 120 N. E. 572 (1918).
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wills, if there was no contract between the spouses. In such
case no estoppel could arise even from the acceptance of benefits.
In Burkhart v. Rogers,41 husband and wife made a joint
will giving all to the survivor but making provision for other
beneficiaries in the event of their simultaneous death. The
husband had a daughter by a previous marriage who was not
mentioned in the will. It was held that the statutory rights of a
pretermitted child as a forced heir could be exercised in spite
of the contractual character of the will. Here again the result
is not in conflict with but rather supports the principle of the
marriage cases inasmuch as the birth of the daughter ante-dated
the will and the marriage.
4. REPUDIATION DURING THE LIFE-TIME OF BOTH TESTATORS
A peculiar attitude has sometimes been assumed toward
agreements for concerted wills. Although they are looked upon
as contractual, yet it is frequently held that one of the testators
may repudiate his will after notice to the other party. The first
English case in which this view was taken (which was said to be
a novelty) is Du four v. Perira.42  American courts took up
this doctrine of notice, apparently regarding the survivor as
estopped not simply because of benefits received under the will
of the first to die, but also because it was then too late, after a
secret repudiation, for the former to make other plans. 4.
Though not until death without notice of repudiation does the
will become irrevocable, 44 yet it is not freely revocable. So
where the survivor had notice of the repudiation by the first
41134 Okla. 219, 273 Pac. 246 (1928).
'1 Dick. 419, 21 E. R. 332 (Ch. 1769). See also Walpole v.
Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402, 30 E. R. 1076 (1797) and Denyssen v. Mostert,
8 Moo. 502, 526, 17 E. R. 400 (P. C. 1872). The Roman-Dutch law
did not permit the survivor to withdraw.
' Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934); see Buehrle
v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920); Frazier v. Patterson,
243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216 (1909); Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102,
274 N. W. 99 (1937); Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N. W. 619
(1919); Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042 (1917);
Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S. W. 188 (1926), and see Herman
v. Ludwig, 174 N. Y. S. 469 (App. D. 1919), affd, 229 N. Y. 544, 129
N. E. 908 (1920); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N. W. 185
(1912); Minor v. Minor, 15 Ohio Dec. 264 (1904); Canada v. Ihmsen,
33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927 (1925).
"Wallace v. Wallace, 216 N. Y. 28, 109 N. E. 872 (1915); see Ex
Parte Day, 1 Brad. 476 (N. Y. Surr. 1851); Minor v. Minor, 15 Ohio
Dec. 264 (1914-).
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to die, he could have changed his own will, but after death of
the latter, it becomes then too late for the survivor to revoke.45
Where, however, the Statute of Frauds stands in the way, the
presence or absence of notice of repudiation during the lifetime
of both cannot usually be important. 46
As intimated above, stress is laid by other courts not
simply, or even at all, on notice, but rather on the receipt of
benefits by the survivor. This fact supposedly creates an es-
toppel,4 7 and there would be no estoppel on the survivor if he
should not have the will of the first to die probated 4s and
should make no claim under it. Nor is there an estoppel where
the joint maker first to die owned only an inconsiderable prop-
erty. So also where the power to revoke is reserved, there could
be no estoppel.4 9 Thus, there would be the continuing possi-
bility of revocation with notice, that is to say, a secret repudia-
tion is misleading and so fraudulent and the new beneficiaries
are bound by an estoppel fastened upon the repudiating testator
whereby the revocation is denied effect. On the other side the
survivor may repudiate his own concerted will if he makes no
claim and takes no benefit under the will of the first to die. It
must be admitted that such a theory creates an embarrassment.
Is the will of the first to die to be considered revoked by some
method not provided by statute and by some person other than
the testator ?
If one of the testators had no property, can the joint will
of the two or the concerted wills of both bind them? In Estate
of IHaiisen'" the joint will of husband and wife was held to be
"'Lally v. Cronen, 247 N. Y. 58, 159 N. E. 723 (1928).
'Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932);
Gould v. Mansfield. 103 Mass. 408 (1869); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo
482, 165 S. W. 1027 (1914).'
17 Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N. W. 316 (1938); Meador
v. Manlove, 97 Kan. 706, 156 Pac. 731 (1916); Mosloski v. Gamble,
191 Minn. 170, 253 N. W. 378 (1934); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289,
95 S. W. 347 (1906); Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 185, 282 Pac.
241 (1931); French v. French, 148 S. W. (2d) 930 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920); Moore v. Moore, 198 S. W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Wilson
v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935); Stone v. Hoskins
(1905) P. 194.
"re Rhodes Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 121 Atl. 327 (1923); Hoffert's
Estate, 65 Pa. Sup. 515 (1917) (revocable).
"'Zabel v. Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 109 P. (2d) 177 (1941).
"87 Neb. 567, 127 N. W. 879 (1910). Cf. Re Johnson's Estate,
- Iowa -, 10 N. W. (2d) 664 (1943); Moore v. Samuelson, 107 Kan.
744, 193 Pac. 369 (1920); Rogers, Appellants, 11 Me. 303 (1834).
L. J.-
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his will only inasmuch as he alone had property. In another
case the wife's property was valued at $50, while the husband's
property passing under the will amounted to $29,000. This
disparity was sufficient to enable the surviving husband to re-
voke,-1 there being no adequate consideration for a contract.
To some extent this holding might be regarded as supporting
the view that there can be no joint will unless there is co-
ownership of property. This is not, however, the conclusion
that should be reached. The explanation is that such contrac-
tual will will not be enforced equitably unless there was an ade-
quate consideration. Sometimes also a spouse joins in the will
of the other as a matter of form.5"-' We may therefore fairly
deduce that there is no contractual feature preventing revoca-
tion where the only purpose of the testators is to give each his
property to the other, as also where the property passing under
the will of one is so inconsiderable as to make it unreasonable
to find a contractual intent.-3 The lack of reciprocal provisions
is likely to be a basis for finding no contract, but not necessarily
so.54 The will is likewise revocable if it was not contractual,
though it looked toward behefitting third persons as well as
or rather than either of the testators.
55
The wills may be exact duplicates mutatis imutaizdis, 111 or
they may differ from each other in particulas important or
unimportant. 57  It seems to make no difference, providing
"Re Johnson's Estate, - Iowa -, 10 N. W. (2d) 664 (1943).
"Allen v. Allen, 28 Kan. 14 (1882).
'Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857); Betts v. Harper, 39
Oh. St. 639 (1884); Goods of Raine, 1 Sw. & Tr. 144 (Eccl. 1858);
Re Oldham (1925) Ch. 75.
"McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 142 (1874); Williams v.
Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So. 749 (1918).
Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454 (1870); Cole v. Shelton, 169
Ark. 695, 276 S. W. 993 (1925); Re Davis' Will, 120 N. C. 9, 26 S. E.
636 (1897); Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 E. R. 96 (Eccl.
1822). On revocability, see 3 A. L. R. 172; 43 A. L. R. 1020; 57
A. L. R. 607; 14 B. R. C. 821 and cf. I WOERNER, AmERICAN LAW OF
ADMINISTRATION (1923) sec. 37.
' Rice v. Winchell, 385 Ill. 36, 120 N. E. 572 (1918); Maurer v.
Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N. W. 99 (1937); Lewis v. Lewis, 104
Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919); Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177
Pac. 37 (1918) (See extended discussion of this case in Goddard,
Mutual Wills (1919) 17 MICH. L. REV. 677, at 679-680, 682-684);
McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 Pac. 479 (1913).
" Phillips v. Murphy, 186 Ky. 763, 218 S. W. 250 (1920); Tooker
v. Vreeland, 92 N. J. Eq. 340, 112 Atl. 665 (1921); Stevens v. Myers,
91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198
N. W. 763 (1924).
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there was present an intent to bargain. While generally exe-
cuted simultaneously,-N even this is not necessary to make them
mutual, reciprocal or concerted. ",9
Ail interesting statute is found in Georgia providing:
"Mutual wills may be made either separately or jointly and in
such case the revocation of one is the destruction of the other."'
The purpose of such a statute is difficult to discover. Was
it intended to legalize joint wills which were originally regarded
as invalid ? Does it make all such wills revocable? Was its
purpose to provide for the notice cases so as to make notice im-
material ! What effect does it have, if any, where there has
been an acceptance of benefits by the survivor? Does death
of one affect revocability of the other? Does it apply to bar-
gaining cases or only to those where there was none? Is its pur-
pose simply to avoid a possible application of the anti-lapse
statute to the will of the survivor? It is entirely conceivable
that the statute was passed without adequate consideration of
these various questions.
5. APPLICATION OF ANTI-LAPSE STATUTES
Where the wills are reciprocal in part and in part provide
for third party beneficiaries, no question of the application of
the anti-lapse statute has so far arisen. At least no such case
has been found. But the problem does arise where the testators
prvide each for the other simply. In such cases it has been
said that the will (whether there be two wills or a joint will)
is that of the first to die only"' and the will of the survivor
ceases to exist on the death of the other./ 2 Why should not a
general anti-lapse statute be applicable so as to require the pro-
bate of the reciprocal will of the survivor? The answer seems
to be that the survivor's will has failed because the provisions
,"See, e.g., Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985
(1932).
"Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042 (1917)
(36 days apart); Coghlin v. Coghlin, 26 Ohio C. C. 18 (1904) (one
year apart).
' GA. ANN. CODE (Park, 1914) sec. 3830. See sec. 3906 for anti-
lapse statute.
"Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N. W. 99 (1937);
Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042 (1917).
' Maloney v. Rose, 224 Iowa 1071, 277 N. W. 572 (1938); Wilson
v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935).
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of it lapsed through death and it was not intended to have fur-
ther application. Thus it is a conditional will. In Wilson v.
Starbick, 3 the spouses had executed mutual wills in favor of
each other solely. On the death of the surviving husband, his
heirs sought the probate of his will under the anti-lapse statute.
It was held that where there is a contract for mutual wills, the
sole object of which is to benefit the survivor, the mutual will
of the survivor is not to be probated.
The theory is that to apply the anti-lapse statute would
defeat the intent of the testators. This does not occur where
third parties have an interest under the will or wills and in that
situation the anti-lapse statute might have application, though
the only one who raises the issue will probably be the third party
beneficiary. 4 So, though the contract wills of testators avoid
this particular statute, it would seem that concerted wills, not
the result of a bargain, should both be probated, that of the
survivor as well as that of the first to die, no reason appearing
why each will should not have its normal significance and force
under the anti-lapse statute. It is the contract that avoids the
application of the statute. No such case has been found.
In Oklahoma it was held that the anti-lapse statute failed
to apply not simply because the wills of the two testators
amounted only to the will of the first to die, but also because
the statute-itself limited the takers to lineal descendants, which
were lacking. 5 If the intention is that the two wills shall be
the will of the first to die and not of the survivor, as above
pointed out, then one case, Burkhar! v. Rogers,0 seems to be
in conflict with that rule. There the joint will of the spouses
gave all to the survivor. The wife died first. The husband
had, however, pretermitted a daughter, which would cause his
will to fail in part. If the principle that only the will of the
first to die exists as a will were applied here, then it should
make no difference that tbl will was partially ineffective on
the side of the one last to die. The wife's will in that case was
held to fail, however, for lack of consideration. In Keasey v.
116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935). See Note (1936) 36 COL.
L. REV. 644.
"See e.g., Lugauer v. Husted, 228 Mich. 76, 199 N. W. 682 (1924).
'Royston v. Besett, 183 Okla. 643, 83 P. (2d) 874 (1938).
' 134 Okla. 219, 273 Pac. 246 (1928).
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EaglCs0 7 the agreement was that the survivor should leave the
property to the daughter of the two testators. The daughter
predeceased the survivor, leaving no issue. This is assigned as
the reason for not applying the statute to the will of the sur-
vivor.
6. THE EVIDENCE AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Where a joint will, or concerted separate wills, recite a
,,ontract between the parties thereto the wills become, in effect,
irrevocable, for proof of the contract is immediately available. 8
The nature of the remedy for a breach of contract is not at issue
at this point.
Suppose that the wills are (a) reciprocal, (b) identical
ijn(ualis imntanidis, (c) executed at the same time and place, (d)
drafted by the same draftsman and attested by the same wit-
nesses. Is all this sufficient proof of bargaining so that the
survivor is bound, or are both bound, prior to the death of
either? A good many courts have regarded these circumstances
as sufficient evidence of a contract and regard the testators as
bound thereafter. 19 In Rob hisoni v. MandellT 0 there was the same
draftsman but different witnesses and different places of execu-
tion and though the occasions were different, both executions
. 259 Mich. 178, 242 N. W. 878 (1932). See MicH. CoMP. LAWS
(1929) sec. 15552.
"Houck v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. 502, 131 Pac. 975 (1913); Warwick
v. Zimmerman, 126 Kan. 619, 270 Pac. 612 (1928); Coghlin v. Coghlin,
26 Ohio C. C. 18 (1904); Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37
(1918).
" Brown v. Johnson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1921) (A strong
case. Thus, wills may not refer to each other but the contract,
wholly parol, is inferred from them); Maurer v. Johansson, 223
Iowa 1102, 274 N. W. 99 (1937); Chambers v. Porter, 183 N. W. 431(Iowa, 1921); Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042(1917); Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N. W. 56
(1915); Baker v. Syfritt, 157 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910); Murphy
v. Black, 44 Iowa 176 (1876); Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S. W.(2d) 350 (1935); Desmeumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl.
703 (1909); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210(1915); Harris v. Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S. W. (2d) 53 (1927);
Wagnon v. Wagnon, 16 S. W. (2d) 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Wilson
v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935); Doyle v. Fischer,
183 Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763 (1924). This seems to have been the
view of the late Professor Goddard, Mutual Wills (1919) 17 MicH. L.
REV. 677. Cf. Plemmons v. Pemberton, 117 S. W. (2d) 395 (Mo.
App., 1938) (two wills by brothers who were partners-parol evi-
dence sufficient).
Fed. Cas. No. 11, 959.
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occurred on the same day. Those facts made no difference for
the acts of the two constituted a single transaction. Special
emphasis is sometimes laid upon the reciprocal character as
evidence of a bargaining, especially where the two wills are
duplicates. 1 It is difficult, however, to see that there is any
bargain implied from any or all of these circumstances. The
wills are what they would normally be, that is, they provide for
those who would be provided for according to the ties of rela-
tionship. When one considers the claims of those who are ex-
pectant beneficiaries under a later will of the survivor, or by
virtue of later relationships, the bargaining character of mutual
or joint wills should be clear, if a revocation is to be prevented.
These and other courts hold that an additional binding ele-
ment may be found in the acceptance of benefits under the will
of the first to die without observing that the whole object may
have been simply to provide for the survivor.7 2 The objection
to this conclusion is again the lack of evidence that the testators
were bargaining. The mere acceptance of benefits under re-
ciprocal wills 'is surely not adequate proof that a bargain was
made. There should therefore be no estoppel on the survivor,
for that reason only, nor should his refusal to be bound be evi-
dence of fraud.7 :
Is a joint will which is reciprocal, identical as to the pro-
visions of the different makers mutatis mutandis and with, of
course, the same draftsman and witnesses more clearly evidence
-'Brown v. Johnson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1921); Knox v.
Perkins, 86 N. H. 66, 163 Ati. 497 (1932); Wallace v. Wallace, 216
N. Y. 28, 109 N. E. 872 (1915); Ridders v. Ridders, 156 Ore. 165. 65
P. (2d) 1424 (1937) (two sisters and a brother); Dicks v. Cassels,
100 S. C. 341, 84 S. E. 878 (1915); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1936) sec. 494, n.
,2Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928); Frazier v.
Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216 (1909); Gibson v. Crawford, 247
Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932); Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 Minn.
170, 253 N. W. 378 (1934); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W. 347
(1906); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915);
Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 185, 282 Pac. 241 (1931) (Acceptance
of benefits by survivor binds him whether or not there was a con-
tract); Re Burke's Estate, 66 Ore. 252, 134 Pac. 11 (1913); French v.
French, 148 S. W. (2d) 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Sherman v.
Goodson's Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 -(Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Wilson v. Star-
buck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935). See, further, Drake, The
Public Policy of Contracts to Will Future Acquired Property (1909)
7 MICH. L. REv. 318, at 319.
' But see Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1920).
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of a bargaining than are separate wills? Some courts have seen
a distinction in this respect between a joint will and two sepa-
rate wills.7 4 They believe that in the case of joint wills there
must have been a bargaining agreement between the testators.7 5
Other courts, however, refuse to find that such wills are of
themselves evidence of a bargain.76 This is particularly true
wlere the joint will resembles a deed in its draftsmanship and
one spouse has signed as a formality believing that, like a deed,
siuh formality was esssential to its validity.77  Unquestionably
,oncerted action is always present, but it is difficult to see that
the mere fact that the will is joint is evidence of an intent to
barg-ain any more than are two mutually reciprocal wills.
Joint wills sometimes have the appearance of a deed of con-
veyance or of a contractTs and may recite, "WVe or either of
us" etc.7 9 A deed in form may be construed to be a will be-
cause it was made deliverable only at death.81 Thus,-in a cer-
tain case one of the spouses executed a conveyance to the other
not deliverable until death, while the other made a will.SI The
first mentioned instrument also was held to be testamentary. In
another case - the spouses executed both deeds and wills and the
Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W. 1027 (1914); Edson v.
Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898).
"Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98 (1859); Rastetter v. Hoenninger,
214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915); Kenney v. Kenney, 45 Ohio App.
249, 186 N. E. 853 (1933); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So.
749 (1918). See Goddard, Mutual Wills (1919) 17 Micn. L. REv.
677: cf. Howells v. Martin, 101 N. J. Eq. 275, 137 Atl. 565 (1927)
(parol evidence not sufficient to prove contract).
Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454 (1870); Rolls v. Allen, 204
Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928); Coveney v. Conlin, 20 App. D. C. 303
(1902); Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E. 319 (1928); Kluss-
man v. Wessling, 238 Ill. 568, 87 N. E. 544 (1909); Menke v. Duwe,
117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165
S. W. 1027 (1914); Howells v. Martin, 101 N. J. Eq. 275, 137 Atl. 565
(1927); Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898); Flower
v. Flower, 166 N. E. 914 (Ohio App. 1928); Holman v. Lutz, 132 Ore.
185, 282 Pac. 241 (1929); Beveridge v. Bailey, 53 S. D. 98, 220 N. W.
462 (1928); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920); Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S. E. 739 (1894); Gray v.
Perpetual Trustee Co. (1928) A. C. 391.
Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924).
Houck v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. 502, 131 Pac. 975 (1913); Hershy
v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 151 N. E.
307 (1934); American Trust Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N. E.
843 (1928); Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924);
Moore v. Samuelson, 107 Kan. 744, 193 Pac. 369 (1920).
"Burkhart v. Rogers, 134 Okla. 219, 273 Pac. 246 (1928).
"Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924).
" Sappington v. King, 49 Ore. 109, 89 Pac. 142 (1907).
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instruments were all construed together as wills. In still
another case8 3 the instrument was in form both a contract
and a conveyance to stand seized and was construed to be a will.
Where the wills do not recite the agreement, does the
Statute of Frauds apply so that it prevents the proof of a con-
tract? It has already been shown that the mere fact that two
or more testators made identical or substantially identical wills,
at about the same time, using the same draftsman and witnesses,
should not be regarded as showing a bargaining between the
parties, 4 though the authorities cannot be said to be entirely in
harmony, even in this regard. 5
As respects the Statute of Frauds 6 the execution of wills
or a will in pursuance of an oral agreement would seem to be
not simply a part performance but a full performance, if it be
proved that the parties bargained. The result should be a bind-
ing obligation. This should be true, even though there is no
reference in the wills to the contract. A considerable number
of courts have so held and numerically they may be in the ma-
jority.8 7 The fact of a binding obligation, wholly oral, is some-
times inferred from correspondence of the testators with third
persons even when it did not identify the wills, or the property,
or the parties.8, A serious difficulty is thus posed where the
'Taylor v. Wait, 140 Ore. 680, 14 P. (2d) 283 (1932).
4 Robertson v. Robertson, 94 Miss. 645, 47 So. 675 (1908).
'See, e.g., Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W. 1027 (1914);
Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P. (2d) 14 (1931).
1 See Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932)
holding that the Statute of Frauds applies; Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga.
738, 144 S. E. 319 (1928); Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich. 517, 260 N. W.
759 (1935).
'See Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as
Affected by the Statute of Frauds (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 749.
' Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1921); Coveney
v. Conlin, 20 App. D. C. 303 (1902); West v. Sims, 153 Kan. 248, 109
P. (2d) 479 (1941); Meador v. Manlove, 97 Kan. 706, 156 Pac. 731
(1916); Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932);
Lugauer v. Husted, 228 Mich. 76, 199 N. W. 682 (1924); Carmichael
v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N. W. 173 (1888); Mosloski v. Gamble,
191 Minn. 170, 253 N. W. 378 (1934); Howells v. Martin, 101 N. J. Eq.
275, 137 Atl. 565 (1927); Wallace v. Wallace, 130 N. Y. S. 58 (Sup. Ct.
1910); Taylor v. Wait, 140 Ore. 680, 14 P. (2d) 283 (1932) (The con-
fidential character of the attorney draftsman will not prevent him
from being a witness); Re Burke's Estate, 66 Ore. 252, 134 Pac. 11
(1913); Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 192 (1923); Turnip-
seed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757 (1900); Larrabee v. Porter,
166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
'Robinson v. Mandell, Fed. Cas. No. 11, 959; Taylor v. Wait, 140
Ore. 680, 14 P. (2d) 283 (1932).
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wills do not recite a consideration, since the mere fact of execu-
tion is not necessarily the performance of a bargained for trans-
action. This phase of the problem seems to have appealed to
several courts which refuse to find a contract has been proved
and one can scarcely argue that their holding is not sound89
7. THE REMEDY
Probate courts have jurisdiction to determine the validity
of wills and to settle the issue whether or not the wills have been
revoked by later instruments or by acts to the document, or by
'.ircumstances such as marriage, adoption, and birth of children.
But they are likely to have only slight equitable powers and so
eannot pass upon the binding character of a contract intended
to prevent revocation.."" Rarely, if at all, can the probate court
determine whether or not contract wills have been revoked.
Validly executed wills and revocations are to be probated and
the issue respecting a contractual obligation is left for a court
having power to construe the will and the contract.
Most illustrations of the remedy are by way of a construc-
tive trust.' 1  The courts which have held that the contract was
enforceable in equity"2 allow for one or more of several alter-
natives. Thus, it is sometimes held that the revocation may be
enjoined,'13 which, if literally taken, puts the matter beyond the
'Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932);
Phillips v. Murphy, 186 Ky. 763, 218 S. W. 250 (1920). But see
Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S. W. 188 (1926), where only
personal property is involved. Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408
(1869); Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S. E. 739 (1894); McClanahan v.
McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 Pac. 479 (1913); re Edwall's Estate, 75
Wash. 391, 134 Pac. 1041 (1913) (Even the execution of deeds de-
livered in escrow, later probated as wills, was not sufficient per-
formance).
'Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928); Estate of
Rolls, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N. J.
Eq. 340, 112 Atl. 665 (1921); Morgan v. Sanburn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122
N. E. 696 (1919); Underwood v. Myer, 107 Va. 57, 146 S. E. 896(1929); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763 (1924); Estate
of Heys (1914) P. 192.
"See, among others, Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E.
307 (1934); Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N. W. 619 (1919);
Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S. W. 188 (1926); Turnipseed v.
Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757 (1900). See Costigan, Contracts for
Joint and Mutual Wills (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 237, 246; Note (1918)
27 YALE L. J. 542.
"Norton v. Norton, 183 Pac. 214 (Cal. App. 1919); Minor v.
Minor, 15 Ohio Dec. 264 (Franklin C. P. 1904); Re Oldham (1925)
Ch. 75.
"Lovett v. Lovett, 155 N. E. 528, 157 N. E. 104 (Ind. App. 1927);
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reach of the probate court. Estoppel against probate is some-
times asserted.94 Some courts say that they will grant specific
performance of the contract, 95 while others hold simply that
there is a contract remedy9" which may well be an action for
"damages. Traditionally, wills must be revocable. One of the
objections sometimes raised against joint wills is that they vio-
late the principle of revocability.9 7 There is no adequate occa-
sion to violate this principle. 98 A constructive trust or an ac-
tion for damages for breach of contract should usually afford
an adequate ;emedy. Au action to set aside a conveyance made
in breach of contract 99 or to enjoin such a conveyance " " may be
the appropriate remedy. In England the matter has been ad-
justed through an administrative summons where the estate
was in process of settlement.""
Concerted wills may serve a useful purpose, whether they
are joint or several. If there was no element of bargaining
present, the survivor should be free to revoke his will, and the
anti-lapse statute should apply to it. Such wills are condi-
tional and commonly made only to provide for the uncertainty
as to which one will outlive the other. The evidence of an in-
tent to be bound should be clear. If a contractual element is
intended, it should always be inserted in the instruments
whether the wills be several or joint. Lacking this, if the parol
evidence is persuasive on the bargaining issue, then the execu-
tion should be regarded as sufficient part performance of the
oral contract. It is here that courts are likely to be dissatisfied
Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N. W. 316 (1938); Bower v. Daniel..
198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W. 347 (1906); Stone v. Hoskins (1905) P. 194.
" Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S. W. 355 (1917); Larrabee
v. Porter, 166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Sherman v. Goodson's
Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918); Williams v.
Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 So. 749 (1918).
"'West v. Sims, 153 Kan. 248, 109 P. (2d) 479 (1941); Herman v.
Ludwig, 174 N. Y. S. 469 (App. D. 1919), affd. 229 N. Y. 544, 129
N. E. 908 (1920).
' Bright v. Cox, 147 Ga. 474, 94 S. E. 572 (1917); Carle v. Miles,
89 Kan. 540, 132 Pac. 146 (1913); Phillip v. Phillip, 160 N. Y. S.
624 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543 (1875).
"See Hoffert's Estate, 65 Pa. Sup. 515 (1917); ATKINSON, WILLS
(1937) p. 176; Note (1935) 19 MINN. L. REV. 95.
"Phillip v. Phillip, 160 N. Y. S. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
" Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N. W. 173 (1888);
Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N. W. 185 (1912). See Note
(1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 106.
"IRe Oldham (1925) Ch. 75.
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wih the evidence. If a contract is proved, the will is not sub-
ject to statutory revocation by later marriage, nor to other pos-
sible statutory provisions as the cases now stand. If one follows
this reasoning to its logical conclusion, such a will would not be
later revoked even by the subsequent birth of issue of the testa-
tor. In that case the court might resort to the device of an im-
plied condition. If the matter is to be regulated by statute,
some consideration of this possibility would be in order. The
anti-lapse statutes are inapplicable to the will of the survivor
unless the contract specifically co'ntemplates and provides for
it. The revocation of concerted contract wills, either before or
at death, violates the right of the promisee, so that notice of in-
tent to nullify should have no legal consequence, though equi-
table considerations may arise. The survivor may even be en-
joined from repudiation.
Take the case of a man whose wife has died. He has ac-
quired property and has children. On remarriage, he proposes
to provide for the second wife but desires the bulk of his estate
acquired before the second marriage to pass to his children. The
accomplishment of this desire cannot adequately be assured save
by the execution of concerted wills, joint or several, except pos-
sibly by an antenuptial arrangement. But if the wife makes a
will in consideration of the husband's will and disposes of her
property according to her wishes, it seems that in this way the
husband, by will, could see to it that the bulk of his estate would
assuredly come to his children. There is no apparent reason
why such an arrangement should not bind the surviving wife,
providing full disclosures were made and the plan was entered
upon understandingly.
One further suggestion may be taken. It seems to be ad-
visable when concerted wills are undertaken by husband and
wife, that a provision be inserted to the effect that the wills
shall be revocable in case the marriale relation should not eon-
tinue until death.
It thus appears that a wife may be so bound that she be-
comes unable to take advantage of the statute which allows the
wife to renounce the will and take. instead of what the will
(Yives her, the part which the statute assigns her.0 2
."KRS 392.080 (1942).
APPENDIX
Some Statistics
Litigation respecting some issue in joint wills has frequently
been before the courts. Some 165 cases of concerted wills were
looked into in this paper, of which 9 were English and the remainder
American. This probably covers substantially all of 'the American
cases but not all of the English cases.
Two party wills:
Husband. and wife: about 100
Sisters: 12
(State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255 (1896); Lewis
v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857);, Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98
(1859; Phillips v. Murphy, 186 Ky. 763, 218 S. W. (2d) 985
(1932); Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408 (1869); Edson v.
Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898); Clayton v. Liver-
man, 19 N. C. (2 D. & B.) 558 (1837); Betts v. Harper, 39
Oh. St. 639 (1884); Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S. C. 155, 53 S. E. 79
(1903); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920); Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 19 S. E. 739
(1894); Goods of Lovegrove, 2 Sw. & Tr. 453, 164 E. R. 1072
(Eccl. 1862)).
Brothers: 5
(Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291
Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920); Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76, 17
S. W. 199 (1891); Kenney v. Kenney, 45 Ohio App. 249, 186
N. E. 853 (1933); Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S. C. 341, 84 S. E.
878 (1915)).
Brother and sister: 2
(Carle v. Miles, 89 Kan. 540, 132 Pac. 146 (1913); Caw-
ley's Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567 (1890)).
Mother and daughter: 2
(Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); re Weir's Will, 134
Wash. 560, 236 Pac. 285 (1925)).
Mother and son: 3
(Desmeumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 At. 703
(1909); Knox v. Perkins, 86 N. H. 66, 163 Atl. 497 (1932)-
foster relationship; Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E.
319 (1928)).
Father and son: 1
(McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 142 (1874)).
Great-uncle and grand-nephew: 1
(Walpole v. Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402, 30 E. R. 1076 (1797)).
Aunt and niece: 1
(Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 539, 35 S. E. 757 (1900)).
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Brother and sister-in-law: 1
(re Krause's Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P. (2d) 268 (1933)).
Divorced spouses: 1
(Chambers v. Porter, 183 N. W. 431 (Iowa, 1921)).
Partners: 5
(Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920)-also
brothers; Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S. C. 341, 84 S. E. 878 (1915)
-also brothers; Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N. W. 619
(1919)-also husband and wife; Herman v. Ludwig, 174
N. Y. S. 469 (App. D. 1919), affd. 229 N. Y. 544, 129 N. E. 908
(1920)-man and woman later intermarried; Goods of
Raine, 1 Sw. & Tr. 144 (Eccl. 1358) -strangers, partners in
farming. Cf. Watson's Estate, 213 N. C. 309, 195 S. E. 772
(1938), where 3 brothers were partners)).
Strangers: 4
(Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454 (1870)-friends; Goods
of Raine, 1 Sw. & Tr. 144 (Eccl. 1858)-also partners; Canada
v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927 (1925); Izard v. Mid-
dleton, 1 Desans Eq. 116 (1785)).
Three or more party joint wills:
Four sisters: 1
(Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151 (1892)).
Two sisters and two brothers: 1
(Harris v. Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S. W. (2d) 53 (1927)).
Mother, daughter and step-daughter: 1
(Lally v. Cronen, 247 N. Y. 58, 159 N. E. 723 (1928)).
Three brothers: 1
(Watson's Estate, 213 N. C. 309, 195 S. E. 772 (1938)-busi-
ness co-partners).
Two sisters and a brother: 1
(Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 E. R. 96 (Eccl. 1822)).
Three sisters: 1
(Eversdell v. Hill, 68 N. Y. S. 719 (App. D. 1901)).
